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DEBATING THE FIELD CIVIL CODE 105 YEARS
LATE
Andrew P. Morriss,* Scott J. Burnham* and Hon. James
C. Nelson**
In 1895, Montana adopted a version of the Field Civil Code
- a massive law originally drafted by New York lawyer David
Dudley Field in the early 1860s. The Civil Code (and its
companion Political, Penal, and Procedural Codes) were adopted
without debate, without legislative scrutiny, and without
Montanans having an opportunity to grasp the enormity of the
changes the Codes brought to the Montana legal system. In
sponsoring this debate over whether to repeal the Civil Code,
the Montana Law Review is finally giving Montana the
opportunity to examine the merits of the Civil Code that she was
denied 105 years ago.
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CODIFICATION MOVEMENT
Early in the Nineteenth Century, a vigorous legal reform
movement sprang up in Europe and soon spread to the
Americas.' At the forefront of this movement was the English
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Law
and Regulation, Professor of Law & Associate Professor of Economics at Case Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, and Senior Associate, Political Economy Research
Center, Bozeman, Montana.
Andrew P. Morriss authored the introductory material to this article and he also
served as the moderator of the Field Code Debate. All material preceding the
transcribed remarks of the two Field Code debaters, Scott J. Burnham and Hon. James
C. Nelson, is attributable to Andrew P. Morriss.
Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law. Scott J. Burnham
participated in the Field Code Debate and argued in favor of repealing the Montana
Field Code. Scott J. Burnham's transcribed remarks from the Field Code Debate appear
in this article after the introductory material by Andrew P. Morriss.
*** Associate Justice of the Montana Supreme Court. The Hon. James C. Nelson
participated in the Field Code Debate and argued against repealing the Montana Field
Code. The Hon. James C. Nelson's transcribed remarks from the Field Code Debate
appear in this article after the introductory material by Andrew P. Morriss.
1. The general history of codification described in this section is based on Andrew
P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 355 (1999). Those
interested in detailed footnotes should refer to that article. Where my previously
published works are the basis for my statements, I will cite to them rather than to
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philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who coined the verb "to codify"
during his lengthy campaign to reduce the common law to a set
of statutes. Bentham tried to gain a commission to codify
English law and American law. He wrote President James
Madison, for example, in 1811 to volunteer to produce a
complete code at no cost to free America from "the yoke of the
wordless, as well as boundless, and shapeless shape of common,
alias unwritten law... [which] remains still about your necks."2
Not having done much research on America, Bentham was
unaware that-then at least-the states, rather than the federal
government, were the source of most law, which explains why he
wrote first to Madison instead of to the states' governors.
The War of 1812 and the burning of Washington prevented
an immediate reply from Madison. In the interim Bentham
learned about the state-based nature of common law in the
United States and promptly wrote all the state governors with
the same offer. Only the New Hampshire governor expressed
any interest, an interest not shared by the legislature. Although
no one accepted Bentham's offers, he did help create an
intellectual climate favorable to codification in the United
States.
The combination of Bentham's efforts, including his
extensive writings on the subject,3 and the popularity of the
French Code Napoleon, led many Americans to advocate
codification throughout the early Nineteenth Century. Many of
the best legal minds of the century wrote on codification,
including Joseph Story, who wrote a report on the subject for
Massachusetts in the 1830s.4 One enthusiastic convert was a
New York lawyer named David Dudley Field, who embraced
codification as a lifelong passion. Indeed, he chose to mark his
original sources. For quotations, I will provide citations to the original sources. Those
interested in the codification movement should also consult the excellent biography of
David Dudley Field: DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
THE LAW (1986) and the comprehensive review of the pre-Civil War codification
American movement: CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981).
2. Letter from Jeremy Bentham to President James Madison (Oct. 30, 1811) in 8
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JEREMY BENTHAM 182, 182 (Stephen
Conway ed., 1988).
3. These are collected in JEREMY BENTHAM, 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD':
WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW AND EDUCATION (Philip Schofield and Jonathan
Harris, eds. 1998).
4. See JOSEPH STORY, Codification of the Common Law, in THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 698 (William W. Story, ed., Charles C. Little & James
Brown, 1852).
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grave with the notation of his efforts at codification.
Field was not simply any lawyer. As the century wore on he
became one of the wealthiest lawyers in the United States,
earning over $75,000 a year during the late 1860s and 1870s,
representing controversial and wealthy clients like Jay Gould
and Boss Tweed. Indeed, Field helped spark the development of
the modern bar association and legal ethics rules in reaction to
his tactics.
Field and two others were appointed in 1857 to draft codes
of laws governing civil, criminal, and political matters for New
York. Field had already participated in drafting a procedure
code to govern civil actions. The code commissioners' mission
was wide ranging: not to simply collect the law and reduce it to
the form of a statute, but also to improve upon it. Field attacked
his work with great gusto, creating a complete set of multiple
codes by 1865 covering virtually every aspect of law - criminal,
civil, organization of government, and procedure in courts.
The codes met with little interest in New York, however,
and disappeared for the time being there. They resurfaced in the
1880s and twice passed both houses of the New York
Legislature, being vetoed both times by the governor. Field
fought for adoption throughout the 1880s, making yearly
pilgrimages to Albany, but never succeeded.
The draft codes did catch the attention of the bench and bar
of Dakota Territory; the Civil Code was adopted in the Dakota
Territory in 1866, all four codes in California in 1872, all four in
Dakota Territory in 1877, and finally all four in Montana in
1895.
During the long debate in New York, Field and his allies
had three main arguments in favor of codification. First,
codification would enable people to know the law, a necessary
part of the rule of law. 5 The common law was too difficult to
understand and lawyers were monopolists of access to the
system, preventing the common people from properly
understanding the law. A typical version of this argument was
the often-reprinted story of how French shopkeepers could
simply pull down their copies of the Code Napoleon and resolve
commercial disputes among themselves without reference to
lawyers or courts. 6
Second, the proliferation of case reports made the practice of
5. Justice Nelson makes a similar point, infra.
6. Justice Nelson gives a more modern version of this argument, infra.
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law too expensive and time consuming and reduction to a single,
scientifically arranged volume7 of the tens of thousands of
volumes of case reports would greatly ease the burdens of
lawyers and judges.8
Third, nonlawyers who were part of the government, such
as justices of the peace, would find the clear writing of the codes
more comprehensible than the technicalities of the common law
and so administer the law more fairly and correctly.9
Field was opposed in New York by an equally prominent
lawyer, James Coolidge Carter and virtually the entire state
bar. Carter and the other anti-codifiers made four main counter
arguments. First, Field's claim that lay individuals would be
able comprehend the codes was simply wrong. Many would be
unable to read at all and others would not be able to understand
the codes even if they could read. Even those who could both
read and understood the codes might neglect to do so. Moreover,
there were plenty of books written on particular areas of the law
that synthesized the law so that it was comprehensible.10
Second, the increase in case reports was not a bad thing, but
the result of progress: greater understanding of the principles of
the law led naturally to an increase in the number of decisions
explaining those principles."
Third, the "precise formulas"12 of the codes were actually
less comprehensible to lay readers than the principles of justice
which formed the basis of the common law. Reducing those
principles to a code would undercut administration of the law.13
Most importantly, Carter argued that codification was
impossible. Without knowing the facts of future transactions,
the codifier could not frame the correct rule. Even if a complete
set of rules could be written down today, it would freeze the law
and so prevent the development of rules needed tomorrow,
7. As Professor Burnham points out, infra, this arrangement is no longer present
in Montana's statute law.
8. Justice Nelson elaborates on this argument, infra.
9. Justice Nelson discusses this point, infra.
10. Professor Burnham provides a compelling example illustrating this point,
infra.
11. Professor Burnham addresses this point, infra. Justice Nelson offers an
interesting counter-example in support of the Code being more flexible, infra.
12. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN LAW 20-21
(New York & Albany, Banks & Bros. 1889).
13. Professor Burnham presents an interesting elaboration on this point, infra. He
also raises the issue of clear versus muddy rules, infra, a distinction that I do not believe
the Nineteenth Century code proponents and opponents articulated.
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losing the common law's ability to evolve.
As this short summary suggests, the debate over
codification in New York and elsewhere was intense and
thorough. Code proponents and opponents sparred repeatedly
across the country and across the century over the relative
merits of the common law and the codes.
THE MONTANA "DEBATE"
In 1895, Montana became the fourth state to adopt a set of
codes based on Field's drafts and the sixth state to adopt a civil
code - Georgia and Louisiana have codes not based on Field's. In
forty-two days that year, the Fourth Legislature adopted more
than 170 pounds of laws, an estimated 784,000 words, a record
that I suspect remains unsurpassed even by the state's
Legislature today.
Here is the short version of the story, which is set out in
greater detail elsewhere.14 Montana was afflicted by a horribly
confused set of laws almost from its beginnings as a legal entity.
When the Idaho Territory, which included present day Montana,
was organized out of the Washington Territory, there were no
copies of Washington's statutes in the Idaho Territory. When
Sidney Edgerton arrived in Montana in the mid-1860s on his
way to be Attorney General of the Idaho Territory, he was
struck by the vast size of the Territory. After wintering in
Bannack, Edgerton headed back to Washington, D.C. to get
Montana made into a territory of its own, with him as its
governor. Things were a bit better for the fledgling Montana bar
than they had been for the Idaho bar: when Montana Territory
was organized, the new Territory's lawyers at least had one copy
of the Idaho Territorial statutes to share. The assembled bar, a
relatively small group, decided these would apply until they got
their own Legislature organized.
Montana at that time had a large population of Southern
sympathizers. These were often men who were sympathetic with
the Confederacy only up to a point - they had not been
sympathetic enough, for example, to pass up a chance to get rich
mining for gold to fight for the South. Edgerton, and his son-in-
law Wilbur F. Sanders, who plays a role in this story later, were
14. The account of Montana's adoption of the Field Codes given here is based on
Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws--Lessons from One
Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 359 (1995) and Andrew P.
Morriss, Decius S. Wade's 'The Common Law', 59 MONT. L. REV. 225 (1998).
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both Republicans, as one would expect of Federal appointees.
Edgerton and the Democrat-dominated Legislature almost
immediately got into a dispute about redistricting, and the
Legislature adjourned without passing a redistricting plan.
This left a legal vacuum because the organic act establishing the
Territory required a redistricting plan to be passed in the first
session.
Edgerton took off for Washington, D.C., in part to get paid,
as the distractions of the Civil War had led to a delay in sending
funds. (Edgerton had been paying for the Territory's government
out of his own pocket -- not exactly what he envisioned when he
took the patronage job.) The governor's departure left Thomas
Meagher, his secretary, in charge. Meagher had been an Irish
revolutionary, sentenced to death, exiled to Australia, and had
eventually worked his way to the United States where he
wangled the appointment as Territorial Secretary. (His statue
sits outside the Montana Capitol today.)
As Acting Governor, however, Meagher's sympathies shifted
to the Democrats, whom he thought would elect him Senator
when the Territory became a state. Meagher called a new
session of the Legislature to pass a redistricting plan. Sanders
and the rest of the Republicans were outraged. They successfully
had the "illegal" Legislatures' acts overturned by Congress. The
Legislature retaliated by redistricting the judges to the wilder
parts of the Territory. Edgerton also arranged a Congressional
repeal of all laws passed by these Legislatures, although not
until after the Fourth Legislature had met.
The result of all this was a disaster-portions of statutes
were repealed, words added to now legally non-existent statutes,
and so forth. Montana never really recovered from this before
statehood in 1889. There were attempts at clearing things up,
but those attempts usually just made things worse.
Thus, when what turned out to be the last Territorial
Legislature met in 1889, codification seemed like a good idea for
at least two reasons. First, the statutes were a mess and the
idea of a rational, organized body of law was appealing. Second,
due to partisan wrangling in Congress, Montana was long
overdue to become a state. Codification was a chance to show
how "modern" a state Montana would be-like California and
New York, Montana would tackle the law as a problem to be
rationalized. Unlike New York, Montana would succeed. At a
time when Montana was still almost literally putting itself on
the map, this was an appealing argument.
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The last Territorial Legislature therefore authorized a code
commission to draft a civil code, covering private law subjects
like contracts, torts, and property; a civil procedure code,
covering the rules of courts; a political code, covering the
organization of the governments of the state; and a penal code.
Prominent lawyers, judges, and politicians were appointed and
the three member commission got down to work. They started
with the version of the Field Codes adopted in California and
worked from there, making relatively few changes. Everyone
cheered, with both the Democratic and Republican press lauding
the appointments, a rather unusual event.
In February 1892, the commission reported the four codes.
In 1893, the Legislature convened but did not pass the codes --
not because of any particular objection, although there was a
flurry of complaints from some lawyers and mayors -- but
because it was too busy trying to pick Montana's senators.
Because the Third Legislature was divided among three parties
and because the Democrats, who had a plurality, were
themselves divided, the daily balloting for a senator was never
successful. A move was made to get a special session for the
codes, but the governor refused because he thought a special
session would be too short to consider the codes fully.
In 1894, the Republicans swept to power in Montana, riding
a wave of disenchantment with Grover Cleveland and the
popularity of the Republicans' support for silver. The House in
the Fourth Legislature appointed a special committee to handle
the codes, interestingly made up primarily of people from
Southwest Montana, as was the Senate Judiciary committee
that handled them in the Senate. Many members proposed
amendments to the commission's drafts but the bar and
committee members were united in the need to pass the codes
unchanged. The code proponents argued that the Legislature
must pass the codes first and take up amendments later, lest
the amendments bog the whole enterprise down and prevent
passage.
The code proponents largely succeeded in steering the codes
through without amendment. Only two sets of amendments
made it into the codes before passage. The livestock industry
managed to get one set of amendments through. Interestingly,
the other major amendments fixed concerns held by members of
the Legislature. As drafted, the codes removed a rich set of
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what a newspaper called "boodle" 5 by having school texts
chosen by the superintendent of schools instead of the
Legislature, and barring perks like free rail passes given
annually by railroads to members of the Legislature. Both
provisions were changed.
To pass the codes, the proponents argued that they were
simply collections of existing rules and that there was little new
in them. This was either the result of ignorance or dishonesty,
since after passage people discovered all sorts of things in the
codes that were not only new but quite importantly different
from previous Montana law. One newspaper summed up the
passage through the Legislature as the codes having been bolted
like a "dose of castor oil."16
After passage, the Legislature had to figure out how to
physically create the new laws. The normal procedure was to
have the bills that passed copied by the clerks of the House
Committee on Enrollment into a clean copy. Because of the
codes' physical size, this posed a serious problem.
The problem was made more severe by the fact that a House
committee was about to issue a report labeling eleven of twenty-
six existing clerks as incompetent. Worse, the report attacked a
fundamental part of the patronage system that allowed
members to have their friends and constituents appointed to
these jobs by centralizing clerks into a central pool.
Happily for the Legislature, the codes offered a solution to
this political problem. Having the massive bills copied out by
hand would take more clerks, not fewer. The Legislature quickly
tabled the investigative report and proceeded to hire more
clerks. It did so despite letters from the governor and other
officials pointing out that there was no real need to copy these
massive bills out by hand, since there had been almost no
amendments made during the debate. And, by the end of the
session, more than 88 clerks had been hired, at $5 per day-a
pretty good wage in 1895.
Montana's adoption of the Field Civil Code thus sprang out
of a number of particular events in her history as a Territory
and state, and out of a strong current of legal reform that spread
across the world and across the United States during the
nineteenth century from the Code Napoleon to the Montana
Civil Code.
15. Present Outlook, DAILY MisSOULIAN, Jan. 27, 1895, at 1.
16. Code Bills Passed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 26, 1895, at 5.
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One thing that did not happen in Montana in 1895,
however, was a real debate over the codes before they were
adopted. Montana newspapers and their accounts reveal almost
no discussion of the adoption of the four codes and surprisingly
little legislative attention. Compared, for example, to the
enormous amount of time Montana legislators devoted to
adjusting county boundaries or choosing school text books, there
was a stunning lack of commentary or discussion. The debate
here is, in part, an attempt to rectify that omission.
THE DEBATE TODAY
For this debate, the Montana Law Review chose a format
built around several questions, to which each of the debaters
will respond. These questions were drawn from Nineteenth
Century writers on codification and are questions that might
have been asked, had Montanans had the opportunity to debate
the Civil Code in 1895. The questions are:
" Is Montana law, code and common law together, more
accessible to the general public because of the Civil
Code?
* Is the hybrid nature of Montana's legal system (since the
code is added to a common law system) better or worse
than a "pure" common law system?
* Does the Civil Code make Montana's law more "settled,
harmonious and fixed?"
" Has the Montana Civil Code reduced the volume of the
law? Should it?
* Would Montana's law be capable of better adapting to
local conditions or changing conditions without the Civil
Code's constraints?17
The following paragraphs briefly discuss the background to
each of these questions. However, no background is provided for
the question of whether the Civil Code has reduced the volume
of law.
Is Montana law, code and common law together, more accessible
to the general public because of the Civil Code?
An important issue in the Nineteenth Century debate was
whether a code would make the law more accessible to the
17. These questions are based in part on the analysis in Morriss, Codification,
supra note 1.
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average citizen. The New York Times editorialized in favor of
codification in 1888: "We can put the argument for the code into
three words: Publish the law." i8 A man not noted for using three
words where thirty would do, Montana code proponent Wilbur F.
Sanders, later argued along the same lines:
a citizen of Montana, who has but little money to spend on books,
needs to have lying on his table but three: an English Dictionary
to teach [him] the knowledge of his own mother tongue; this Book
of the Law [the Civil Code], to show him his rights as a member of
civilized society; and the good old Family Bible to teach him his
duties to God and to man.19
Code opponents rejected this argument for several reasons.
First, they thought few people would bother to read codes. Even
if they did, the opponents argued, they would not understand it.
New York lawyer John Strong put it this way in an 1881
pamphlet:
Let any gentleman not versed in the law read a part of this Code,
and ask himself if he feels any more of a lawyer after he gets
through; will he think that there is good meat in the nut, after he
has cracked it, or that it is, as far as he is concerned, a hollow
humbug?...
... [Who but a lawyer, and he an astute and learned lawyer, can
attach their signification to those mysteriously suggestive but
mute sections? 20
Once again we have the benefit of one hundred and five
years of experience with the Civil Code to answer the question of
whether or not it has promoted accessibility of the law.
Is the hybrid nature of Montana's legal system (since the code is
added to a common law system) better or worse than a "pure"
common law system?
Montana, and the other western states that adopted
versions of the Field Code, never went as far as Field wanted --
he wanted to do away with the common law as much as possible,
leaving it only to fill the gaps where the Code was silent.
Montana, California and the Dakotas chose not to -- either
formally, by modifying or dropping Field's provision that the
Code preempted the common law entirely, or informally, by
18. A Reproach to the Bar, N. Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1888, at 4.
19. Henry M. Field, THE LIFE OF DAvID DUDLEY FIELD 92 (New York, Charles
Scribner's Sons 1898) (quoting Wilbur F. Sanders.)
20. John R. Strong, AN ANALYSIS OF THE REPLY OF MR. DAvID DUDLEY FIELD TO
THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 4-6 (New York, Henry Bessey 1881).
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treating the Code as a collection of statutes rather than as a
civil code in the European sense.
We can hardly blame them for doing so -- American judges,
after all, were not trained to be civil law judges -- but we can ask
whether the hybrid that resulted is better or worse than either
pure system might be. How does the Civil Code function today --
is it the source of clear principles that resolve disputes? Or is it
a trap for the unwary, with statutory provisions lying dormant,
waiting to snare those who do not comb it for possible applicable
provisions?
Does the Civil Code make Montana's law more "settled,
harmonious and fixed?"
Code proponents argued that the common law was
uncertain because of the mass of conflicting precedent. Codes, on
the other hand, would bring stability and clarity to the law, and
provide a vehicle for reconciling inconsistencies in the law. In
part this rested on criticism of case law. For example, the
Albany Law Journal, a leading pro-code legal journal in New
York, commented on the testimony of New York code opponent
James C. Carter that "When Mr. Carter asserted that the
common law is reasonably well settled, easily accessible,
harmonious and fixed, he fairly took our breath away. Every
lawyer at the table knew that it is no such thing, but that it is
obscure, contradictory, inconveniently scattered and
fluctuating."21 In part this argument also rested on a notion that
statutory law would be more organized, more consistent, and
more coherent than the common law.
Code proponents thought they were undertaking a great
work to clarify the law. California codifier Charles Lindley
argued in 1874, for example, that:
It is difficult to measure the importance of this great subject.
Gathering together and arranging in logical order the fragmentary
elements of a legal system, the reorganization and re-expression of
a body of laws for a people, is an event that can have no parallel in
magnitude in the history of that people. A Dictator may take the
place of a President, a commune may sweep away the Dictator;
still the great body of laws remains substantially the same. The
system that we now establish will go down with succeeding
generations, until a new race shall come, or until new conditions,
wrought under the law of progress, shall make a new system
21. Current Topics, 35 ALB. L.J. 81, 82 (1887).
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necessary in one, five or twenty centuries. 22
Thus, a question for our debaters is whether Montana's
experience with the Civil Code suggests that the code
proponents or the code opponents were right about the impact of
the code.
Would Montana's law be capable of better adapting to local
conditions or changing conditions without the Civil Code's
constraints?
The common law advocates who opposed codification
claimed one major advantage for the common law over codes -
the common law was flexible and better able to adapt to change
and local conditions than an inflexible statutory code. James C.
Carter, the leading American common law partisan and code
opponent in the Nineteenth Century, told the American Bar
Association in his 1895 presidential address that code
proponents:
do not always sufficiently remember that so far as respects the
ordinary doctrines of the common law, an innumerable host of
cultivated human intellects, many of them of transcendent ability,
have been studying and reflecting for a thousand years upon what
is just, fit and expedient in all the ordinary affairs of life. The final
conclusions reached by this process are not likely to be amended
by the work of a few revisers giving comparatively brief attention
to each particular topic.23
"Nonsense," replied the code proponents - often echoing
Bentham's biting critique of the common law: "Do you know how
Judges make the common law? Just as a man makes laws for his
dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of you
wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way the
Judges make law for you and me."24
Montana is not New York, California, or one of the Dakotas.
Yet Montana shares with California and the Dakotas a large
amount of law designed in the 1860s for New York. (For works-
in-progress, I have conducted line-by-line comparisons of the
Montana Civil Code with the New York drafts and the
California 1872 version. What is most noticeable is how few
substantive changes there are from either.) Thus, another
question for the debaters is how has the Civil Code adapted to
22. 1 CHAS. LINDLEY, CALIFORNIA CODE COMMENTARIES app. V. (F. Sterrett 1874).
23. James C. Carter, ADDRESS OF JAMES C. CARTER AT THE ANNUAL MEETING,
DETROIT, MICHIGAN, AUGUST 27, 1895, at 24 (Philadelphia, Dando Press 1895).
24. Common Law Fetichism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1886, at 4.
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Montana's differences from the source states?
BETTER LATE THAN NEVER
Debating Montana's Civil Code 105 years late might seem a
little like closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. It is
not. Thinking about the form and structure of our law is an
important exercise, one engaged in all too infrequently by
academics, practitioners, and judges. The history of Montana's
Civil Code is more than a good story (although it is a pretty good
story!) - it raises important issues about the role law plays in
our society and how legislatures and courts should treat the law.
Even after our debate, it seems unlikely to me that the
Montana Legislature is going to be debating the repeal of the
Civil Code anytime soon. But the Montana Legislature might
benefit from considering whether it is repeating the experience
of the Third Legislature as it debates proposed laws. And it
might benefit from considering whether the 1895 Montana
proponents of the Field Civil Code delivered what they promised
- did they make Montana a better place? If not, why not?
David Dudley Field failed to convince most Americans to
abandon the common law. Even in Montana, California, and the
Dakotas, where he succeeded in persuading legislatures to adopt
versions of his Civil Code, he could not break Americans'
attachment to the common law. The obscurity of the history of
the Field Civil Code today makes clear how far from Field's ideal
even the code states are. Occasionally, thinking about why that
is should be high on every lawyer's list of "things to do."
RESOLVED: THE MONTANA FIELD CODE (STATUTES IN COMMON
LAW AREAS SUCH AS CONTRACTS, TORTS AND PROPERTY) SHOULD
BE REPEALED
With this background information in mind, the two
debaters, Professor Scott J. Burnham and the Honorable James
C. Nelson, addressed the questions surrounding the Montana
Field Code. Andrew P. Morriss, author of the immediately
preceding introductory material, served as the debate's
moderator. The remainder of this part of the Montana Field
Code section contains the transcribed remarks from the April 7,
2000 debate entitled "Resolved: The Montana Field Code
(statutes in common law areas such as contracts, torts and
property) Should be Repealed."
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Is Montana law, code and common law together, more accessible
to the general public because of the Civil Code?
PROF. BURNHAM: Thank you, Andy. I want to thank the
Law Review for making this debate possible. When I was asked
to debate on the Field Code, I wasn't aware that we were going
to be replicating the debate that took place in the 19th century,
and I've been amazed at how relevant the arguments that were
made at that time are today. As Andy mentioned, it was argued
then that people would not read the Code, and if they did read
it, they wouldn't understand it.25 I think this argument is borne
out today.
First of all, is the Code really accessible? Does anyone know
it's there? I'm sure Justice Nelson could tell you about all the
briefs he reads where the attorneys make their arguments
oblivious to the Code sections on point, but he probably won't
tell you about all the court opinions that do the same thing.26
This question about the accessibility of the Code came home to
me a couple of years ago when I was asked to speak at a training
conference for Montana Justices of the Peace, who are by and
large not lawyers. In fact, Mary Ann, you may have been there
at that time.27 I was asked to teach them all they needed to
25. See JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WRrITEN AND THE UNWRITTEN
LAW 19-20 (1889), cited in Morriss, Plenty of Laws, supra note 14, at 370.
26. For example, MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-801, which defines consideration, has
been cited 22 times since 1979. In that same time period, the court failed to cite the
statute in 12 other cases where consideration was at issue. See Rickett v. Doze, 184
Mont. 456, 603 P.2d 679 (1979); Keil v. Glacier Park, Inc., 188 Mont. 455, 614 P.2d 502
(1980); Naylor v. Hall, 201 Mont. 59, 651 P.2d 1010 (1982); Carroccia v. Todd, 189 Mont.
172, 615 P.2d 225 (1980); City of Cut Bank v. Glacier County, 270 Mont. 355, 891 P.2d
1174 (1995); Ragland v. Sheehan, 256 Mont. 322, 846 P.2d 1000 (1993); Westlake v.
Osborne, 220 Mont. 91, 713 P.2d 548 (1986); Edgar v. Hunt, 218 Mont. 30, 706 P.2d 120
(1985); Kephart v. Portmann, 259 Mont. 232, 855 P.2d 120 (1993); Dobbins, DeGuire &
Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 218 Mont. 392, 708 P.2d 577 (1985);
Tindall v. Konitz Contracting, Inc., 240 Mont. 345, 783 P.2d 1376 (1989); Nimmick v.
Hart, 248 Mont. 1, 808 P.2d 481 (1991).
Similarly, MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-409, defining mistake, has been cited by
the Montana Supreme Court 15 times since 1979. In that same time period, the Court
failed to cite the statute in 11 cases where mistake was an issue. See Gray v. City of
Billings, 213 Mont. 6, 689 P.2d 268 (1984); Morrison v. Higbee, 204 Mont. 515, 668 P.2d
1025 (1983); Silva v. McGuinness, 189 Mont. 252, 615 P.2d 879 (1980); Woodahl v.
Matthews, 196 Mont. 445, 639 P.2d 1165 (1982); Hartfield v. City of Billings, 246 Mont.
259, 805 P.2d 1293 (1990); Wiley v. Iverson, 295 Mont. 511, 985 P.2d 1176 (1999);
Johnson v. Estate of Shelton, 232 Mont. 85, 754 P.2d 828 (1988); Wright v. Blevins, 217
Mont. 439, 705 P.2d 113 (1985); South v. Transportation Ins. Co., 275 Mont. 397, 913
P.2d 233 (1996); Wray v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 266 Mont. 219, 879 P.2d 725
(1994); Mitchell v. Boyer, 237 Mont. 434, 774 P.2d 384 (1989).
27. Mary Ann Ries, a second-year law student at the time of the debate, was
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know about contracts and I was given 45 minutes to do it. I first
thought, "This will be easy. I'll give them Title 28 of the
Montana Code Annotated, which contains the Field Code
provisions on contracts, and we'll work our way through it." But
then I thought, "They won't learn anything from that in 45
minutes. Instead, I'll teach them a few principles of contract
law and they can apply those principles to most situations."
The first principle is freedom of contract-the agreement is
for the parties to make. This principle does not appear in the
Field Code, even though David Dudley Field said:
In the execution of this vast undertaking, the commissioners have
endeavored to bring together and arrange in order, all the general
rules known to our law upon the subjects contained within the
scope of such a Code, rejecting those which are obsolete or
unsuitable to our present condition, and adding such others as
appeared necessary or desirable.28
Yet he left out this ultimate principle of contracts!
He also left out principle number two: Parties and judges
must do what is reasonable and prudent. If the parties haven't
created a rule for themselves, the rule of contracts is do what is
reasonable in the circumstances. That has been the common
law rule for centuries. That's the process that judges used in
England hundreds of years ago, and it's the rule today. I told
the Justices of the Peace that if you simply follow that guide, do
what's reasonable and prudent, you will come up with the right
result 95% of the time.
Principle number three deals with the other 5%: Follow a
statute when it has mucked up the common law. This is where
the Code is most pernicious, because by reducing the common
law to a bunch of rules, it makes the law seem regulatory, and
the common law of contracts is not regulatory, it's facilitory. Its
function is to facilitate people's conduct of their business, not to
regulate it. If we got rid of all those Code sections that just state
the reasonable common law rules, what would we be left with?
The exceptions, those instances where we are truly trying to
regulate. But in the Code it can be hard to find those provisions
that are regulatory because they are commingled with all the
reasonable provisions derived from the common law.
Secondly, if you do find a relevant Code section, is it really
so easy to understand? I'm going to demonstrate this point with
formerly a Justice of the Peace for Pondera County.
28. Report from David Dudley Field & Alex W. Bradford to the Legislature of the
State of New York (Feb. 13, 1865), in Civil Code of the State of New York, at v (1865).
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a couple of Code sections. Suppose you wonder what a contract
is. Well, the Code tells you: "A contract is an agreement to do or
not to do a certain thing."29 Gee, that sure was helpful. By the
way, since you're getting CLE credit for attending this debate, I
must do a little bit of educating and point out the meaning of all
this gobbledygook you see in the Montana Code Annotated
following the Code section under the word History. What you
find is the history of the enactment of this particular code
section, although not in chronological order. For example:
28-2-101. Contract defined. A contract is an agreement to do or
not to do a certain thing.
History: En. Sec. 2090, Civ. C. 1895; re-en. Sec. 4965, Rev. C.
1907; re-en. Sec. 7467, R.C.M. 1921; Cal. Civ. C. Sec. 1549;
Field Civ. C. Sec. 744; re-en. Sec. 7467, R.C.M. 1935; R.C.M.
1947, 13-101.
Here is that same information in chronological order:
Field Civ. C. Sec. 744 - Source of the California Civil Code
Cal. Civ. C. Sec. 1549 - Source of the Montana Civil Code
En. Sec. 2090, Civ. C. 1895 - Enacted in the Montana Civil
Code, 1895
re-en. Sec. 4965, Rev. C. 1907 - Re-enacted in the Revised Code,
1907
re-en. Sec. 7467, R.C.M. 1921 - Re-enacted in the Revised Code of
Montana, 1921
re-en. Sec. 7467, R.C.M. 1935 - Re-enacted in the Revised Code of
Montana, 1935
R.C.M. 1947, 13-101 - [Re-enacted in the] Revised Code of
Montana, 1947
This history tells you that Montana Code Annotated Section
28-2-101 originated with Field Civil Code Section 744; it was
then enacted in California, as Andy mentioned, in Civil Code
Section 1549; it was enacted by the Montana Legislature in
1895; and then it was re-enacted by the Montana Legislature in
1907, 1921, 1935, 1947 and then in the MCA in 1979. So that's
how you can tell from the History after the MCA sections which
ones are from the Field Code.
Okay, back to whether a Code section is easy to understand,
let's look at the next one, Section 28-2-102, the essential
elements of a contract:
28-2-102. Essential elements of a contract. It is essential to
the existence of a contract that there be:
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-101 (1999) (derived from FIELD CIV. C. § 744).
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(1) identifiable parties capable of contracting;
(2) their consent;
(3) a lawful object; and
(4) a sufficient cause or consideration.30
The first three elements aren't so surprising-identifiable
parties, consent, and lawful object-but number (4) says to have
a contract you have to have "a sufficient cause or consideration."
Everybody knows you have to have consideration. But has
anybody in the 150 years since the Code was written ever
argued that you can have cause for a contract rather than
consideration? Some lawyer is eventually going to read this
thing and argue that to the Montana Supreme Court, but this
concept of cause comes from Justinian and the Roman Codes,
and it's never been argued in the 150 years of California or
Montana history-yet there it is in the Code.31
Another example of sections that are hard to understand
are the maxims of equity. It's ironic that the maxims of equity
are codified in Montana. One of my favorites, Section 1-3-220
was the subject of a Peanuts cartoon a number of years ago that
showed Snoopy as a lawyer carrying a sign that said, "That
which ought to have been done is to be regarded as done, in
favor of him to whom and against him from whom performance
is due."32 Well, I'm glad we have a statute on that point to helpgive us guidance. My other favorite is Section 1-3-228, which
says in total, "Superfluity does not vitiate."33
On the other extreme, we have some Field Code provisions
on contracts for sale. This is an interesting sequence, very
logical order. Section 30-11-103, derived from the Field Code,
tells us that "An agreement for sale is either: (1) an agreement
to sell; (2) an agreement to buy, or (3) a mutual agreement to
sell and buy."34 Then it tells us what an agreement to sell is.
This one reminds me of the sound of one hand clapping, because
it tells us that "An agreement to sell is a contract by which one
engages, for a price, to transfer to another the title to a certain
thing."35 That's an agreement to sell. Now here comes the other
hand clapping, an agreement to buy: "An agreement to buy is a
30. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-102 (1999) (derived from FIELD Crv. C. §§ 745, 748).
31. See generally William Noel Keyes, Cause and Consideration in California - A
Re-Appraisal, 47 CAL. L. REv. 74 (1959).
32. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-3-220 (1999) (derived from FIELD CIV. C. § 1984).
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-3-228 (1999) (derived from FELD Civ. C. § 1992).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-103 (1999) (derived from FIELD Civ. C.§ 857).
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-104 (1999) (derived from FIELD Crv. C. § 858).
2000
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
contract by which one engages to accept from another and pay a
price for the title to a certain thing."36 If anybody can explain to
me how you can have an agreement to sell without an
agreement to buy, or an agreement to buy without an agreement
to sell, I would really like to know, and unfortunately Mr. Field
is no longer available to tell us. But, finally, Section 30-11-106
does put it all together: "An agreement to sell and buy is a
contract by which one engages to transfer the title to a certain
thing to another, who engages to accept the same from him and
to pay a price therefor."37 There we have the sound of the two
hands clapping. A real handy and useful definition of an
agreement to sell and buy.
In conclusion, I find that these Code sections are neither
accessible, nor when you do access them, are they
understandable.
JUSTICE NELSON: One of the three primary arguments
for the codification of the common law, as previously noted, was
that the common law was difficult for individuals, particularly
non-lawyers, to ascertain and this prevented them from learning
the law. In his April 5th, 1894 address to the Helena Bar
Association, Chief Justice Decius S. Wade, a proponent of
codification, eloquently stated:
There is no person in our country, however learned he may be,
who knows all the law, but there is no person, however ignorant
he may be, even though he never saw a law-book and cannot read
or write, who is not presumed to know all the law and to regulate
his conduct accordingly. He is charged with knowledge he does
not possess and cannot acquire; he must observe rules that he
cannot see, and obey commands that he cannot hear.
Not only is he charged with a knowledge of that small
fraction of the law which is contained in our constitutions and
statutes, but with the whole body of the common law, which,
when not in conflict with the written law, is, as to our country,
the law of the land.38
Professor Burnham glossed over an important point: the
only way to know the law was to pour over statute books and
through tens of thousands of reported cases. For the most part,
these statutes and reported cases were written in legalese and
scattered across thousands of volumes. Once located-and
36. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-105 (1999) (derived from FIELD CIV. C. § 859).
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-106 (1999) (derived from FIELD CIV. C. § 860).
38. Decius S. Wade, Necessity for Codification 2 (Helena Bar Association Apr. 5,
1894), reprinted infra.
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usually only lawyers or judges could even find these materials -
a person would then have to try to understand and decipher a
cognizable rule from the multitude of cases reported on a given
point. This, obviously, was all but an impossible task for anyone
not formally trained in the law and without access to an
extensive law library. Thus, learning the law was an impossible
task for nearly everyone.
As David W. Field noted: "[t]hey who are required to obey
the law should have the opportunity to know what they are.
These laws are now sealed in books... They can be opened by
codification and only by codification."39 The whole idea of
codification was to make the law knowable and accessible by
reducing the common law to clearly written principles, putting
those principles into an organized framework, and then
publishing those principles in a few volumes that could be
obtained, read and understood by all persons-especially those
untrained in the law.
I would submit that to a great extent the codification effort,
commencing with the Civil Code, has been successful in
achieving this goal. While the four hand-written volumes of the
Field Code as adopted by Montana in 1895 have now increased
to some 10 volumes with 99 titles, those codes and the laws
passed by each successive session of the legislature are readily
available to all persons. Every lawyer's office has, or should
have, a current set of the Montana Code; county law libraries
have a set; public libraries in the State of Montana have a set;
and, with the advent of the Internet and the availability of a
multitude of legal websites, any man or woman who wants to
know the law has ready access to it. Not only are the civil laws
easily accessible, but so are the criminal laws, the procedural
laws, the Constitution, and all the statutes and administrative
regulations.
The same is true as regards the common law and court
interpretations of statutes and code provisions. In the past
decade, and especially in the last three to five years, the ability
of non-lawyers to research court decisions has been dramatically
enhanced by the advent of the Internet and web-based legal
research engines and data bases. In fact, at no time in the
history of American Anglo-Jurisprudence has the law been more
accessible, more researchable, and thus, more knowable than at
39. David Dudley Field, Codification, reprinted in 3 DAVID DUDLEY FIELD,
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (Titus
Munson Coan ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1890).
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this time in our history. I would submit to you that the
beginnings of this accessibility, this great accessibility and
researchability and knowability that we now enjoy in the law,
can be traced directly to the Field Codes adopted in Montana.
Is the hybrid nature of Montana's legal system (since the code is
added to a common law system) better or worse than a "pure"
common law system?
JUSTICE NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Morriss. Again, one
needs to remember the three principles advanced for
codification. One, the common law was uncertain because of the
mass of conflicting precedent on many points. Two, the common
law was difficult for individuals, particularly non-lawyers, to
ascertain, and this prevented them from learning the law. And
three, the common law inappropriately made judges into
legislators.
Codification made the law certain by reducing well-settled
and often-articulated principles of common law into a written
set of easily understood and logically organized codes, which
provided a right answer for most recurring legal problems,
questions or relationships. In writing these codes, the law, thus,
became more accessible, more researchable and more knowable
to all persons, as we have already discussed. Finally,
codification took the writing of the law out of the hands of judges
and put this task into the hands of the people's
representatives-the legislature. In this way, traditional
notions of separation of powers were enhanced.
By the same token, in those areas of the law where there
were no codes written, where the gaps in the Codes left
unanswered a particular question of law, or where the codes
were in conflict, the "common law system" of case-by-case, judge-
made law was alive, well and fully capable of filling in or taking
up where the effort to codify failed.
I submit that our present "hybrid" system works better than
either a "pure code" or a "pure common law" system for these
same reasons. Montana's codes do not, and probably never will,
cover all legal problems, questions and relationships that occur
in a modern, diverse and technically complex society. Where our
system of codes and statutes do not provide a clear direction or
answer, courts and judges still have a wealth of precedent -- not
only from the common law, but from decisions interpreting
statutes and from other codes -- on which to fashion appropriate
remedies and relief and on which to resolve legal conflicts. I
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submit that such a hybrid system provides the best of both
worlds: the certainty of the codes and, when needed, the
flexibility provided by case-specific analysis and resolution. Not
only is there a correct "code" answer for most legal problems,
there is also a correct answer for legal questions not answered
by the code.
PROF. BURNHAM: In the sense that Field intended it,
where the Code was the only law, we do have a hybrid system.
If you look at that 1895 Montana Code, you'll see that the Civil
Code is all contained in one volume. Today we have 12 Volumes
of the Montana Code Annotated with many titles and the Field
Code itself has been broken up and splintered and scattered
throughout it. You'll find parts of the Field Code in Title 1, Title
28, Title 30, Title 70, and so forth.
Furthermore, a person in Montana today rarely looks at the
basic unifying principles of Field's Code, which are contained in
Title 1 of the Montana Code Annotated. If you go back to Title
1, you'll find some very interesting stuff. Let me show you a
couple of examples. Section 1-1-108 states Field's ideal: "In this
state there is no common law in any case where the law is
declared by statute."40 Statute is it. "But where not so declared,
if the same is applicable and of a general nature and not in
conflict with the statutes, the common law shall be the law and
rule of decision."41 Fair enough. But what is that common law
that Field would have us look at? Look at Section 1-1-109:
1-1-109. Common law of England-when rule of decision.
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or
inconsistent with the constitution of the United States or the
constitution or laws of this state, is the rule of decision in all the
courts of this state.42
That statute is still on the books in the year 2000, so
presumably according to this, if you don't find a statute on point,
you're supposed to cite the common law of England. By the way,
we have it there at the end of this row of books. I think you'll
find some of the spines of those books have never been cracked.
40. The statute provides in full:
1-1-108. Common law-applicability of. In this state there is no common
law in any case where the law is declared by statute. But where not so
declared, if the same is applicable and of a general nature and not in conflict
with the statutes, the common law shall be the law and rule of decision.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-108 (1999) (derived from C. Civ. PROC. § 1895).
41. Id.
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-109 (1999) (derived from CAL. POL. C. § 4468).
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It was an illusion on Field's part to think that the statutes
could ever replace the common law, for the Code itself is largely
a codification of the common law, and it only makes sense in the
context of the common law. Furthermore, a statement of the
common law can explain that context in a way that the naked
Code provisions can't. 43 My worthy opponent exaggerates when
he says we have two choices: thousands of books from which to
distill the rule from the common law, or the simple statement of
the Code. He exaggerates because entrepreneurs have always
been willing to synthesize the common law for us in handy,
single-volume editions. This is of course what Coke4 did, what
Blackstone45 did, and what Farnsworth46 and the Restatements
of Law47 do today. So the rules are easy to find. The
Restatements are very respectable versions of common law
principles that contain a rich context of history and example to
put the rule in perspective so the user can better understand its
meaning.
Unfortunately, the Code provides no such context and this
can lead to misleading interpretations. An example is Section
28-1-1403, from the provisions on accord and satisfaction:
28-1-1403. When part performance extinguishes obligation.
Part performance of an obligation, either before or after a breach
thereof, when expressly accepted by the creditor in writing in
satisfaction or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in writing
for that purpose, though without any new consideration,
extinguishes the obligation.
An accord, you all remember, is an agreement where a
creditor agrees to accept less than the full payment of a debt in
return for discharge of that debt. There's no requirement that
an accord be in writing. Common law didn't require it; the Code
doesn't require it. But, like other contracts, an accord does have
to have consideration, and according to the common law, you
couldn't discharge an obligation by the payment of less because
there was no consideration. In other words, suppose you loaned
me $500, and I asked you, "Will you take $300 to discharge the
43. Two second-year law students who attended the debate, Judith Albright and
Cathleen Sohlberg, pointed out to me that this problem is exacerbated by electronic
research, where a person may find the Code section torn from even the context of other
Code sections.
44. See EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1642).
45. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (William
Draper Lewis ed., Rees Welsh & Co. 1900) (1765).
46. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (3d. 1999).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
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debt?" If you said, "Yes," that does not make a good contract.
You are giving up $200, but because I am giving you nothing
that I didn't already owe you, there is no consideration. But as a
practical matter, a legal system might want to allow people to do
this, to have a final settlement of their disputes. So California
added such a practical rule which made its way into our Code as
Section 28-1-1403. The intention of that statute, which is clear
only from the common law history, is that a writing is a
substitute for consideration. It tells us that part performance of
an obligation, when accepted by a creditor in writing discharges
an obligation that otherwise wouldn't be discharged because of
the consideration problem. In other words, if I say to you, "Will
you take $300 to discharge the $500 debt?" and you respond in
writing, "Yes, I will," then the payment of that $300 does
discharge the debt.
Then the Montana Supreme Court came along, took this
statute out of context, and concluded that a writing is required
for all accords.48 In other words, if I do provide some
consideration, such as when I say to you, "I'll give you $300 and
a hawk or a robe for your return promise to discharge the debt,"
and you agree, according to the court, that agreement needs to
be in writing. That was a mistake that occurred only because
the Code provision was taken out of its common law context,
which again provided that the writing was required only as a
consideration substitute.
In conclusion, if we repealed Code provisions and had a
purely common law system, a mistake like that would not be
made because one would read the entire meaning of the common
law provision in context. And then, as I mentioned earlier, the
statutes would contain only exceptions, provisions in derogation
of the common law. So our hybrid system doesn't work because
we have Code provisions that state the common law but state it
incompletely. What we need is to go back to a common law
system with statutes that provide exceptions to the common law
rules.
48. See Geissler v. Nelson, 222 Mont. 409, 722 P.2d 632 (1986). Professor Scott
Burnham was particularly disappointed by this decision, because just before it came out,
he had clarified the law of accord and satisfaction in Montana in his article, Scott J.
Burnham, A Primer on Accord and Satisfaction, 47 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1986).
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Does the Civil Code make Montana's law more "settled,
harmonious and fixed?"
PROF. BURNHAM: Why do we need a rule of law in civil
areas? To predict an outcome, so we have predictability and
certainty. But as we all know, outcomes are not just a function
of the rule. They are a function of the rules and the facts, which
is why rules are easy to state but hard to apply. In addressing
rules, codes don't give you any of those facts, but the common
law provides a rich, factual context for understanding the rules.
I like my rules a little muddy; Justice Nelson likes them crystal
clear.49 It's probably no coincidence that I prefer rules like
"Drive at a speed that is reasonable and proper,"50 while my
worthy opponent prefers "75."51
I think a Code provision rarely answers a legal question, in
spite of its alleged clarity. For example, what is the rule on how
long an offer remains open? If the Code says an offer is open for
a reasonable time, that's not very helpful. We need the common
law to figure out what is reasonable under different facts and
circumstances. If instead, the Code says an offer is open for 24
hours, then it's harmful. Imagine what a rule like that would do
to the New York Stock Exchange.
Professor Natelson tried to find empirical evidence on this
issue of whether the Code made Montana's law more settled,
harmonious and fixed when he wrote an article on restrictive
covenants and how the Code provisions on restrictive covenants
have fared in Montana. 52 He states in a footnote:
Of course, one could argue that the Field Code has not proved
unsuccessful because the existence of statutory provisions
prevented many cases from being litigated and answered many
49. See generally for terminology Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-303 (1997) provided in pertinent part:
Speed restrictions-basic rule. (1) A person operating or driving a vehicle of
any character on a public highway of this state shall drive the vehicle in a
careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed no greater than is
reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation.
51. See State v. Stanko, 292 Mont. 214, 974 P.2d 1139 (1998) (a majority of the
court, including Justice Nelson, held that the basic rule was unconstitutional). MONT.
CODE ANN. § 61-8-303 (1999) now provides in pertinent part:
Speed restrictions. (1) Except as provided in 61-8-309, 61-8-310, 61-8-312,
and subsection (2) of this section, the speed limit for vehicles traveling:
(a) on a federal-aid interstate highway outside an urbanized area of
50,000 population or more is 75 miles an hour at all times ...
52. See Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV.
17 (1990).
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questions otherwise unanswerable. This is a negative proposition
of the kind difficult to prove or disprove. I did, however, undertake
a search of appellate cases on the subject in Colorado, an
otherwise comparable jurisdiction with a larger population. Not
only has the volume of Colorado litigation been smaller, but as a
former Colorado practitioner, I can testify that Colorado's law of
running covenants, embodied exclusively in the cases, is at least
as clear and predictable as that of Montana. Thus, we return to
the fact that the present state of Montana covenant law is not at
all what the codifiers had in mind.53
In fact, I believe the Code can make matters less settled,
because by taking a Code provision out of context, a lawyer or a
court can construct an argument around it that couldn't be
argued under the common law. My favorite example of this
occurred in the Montana case of Miller v. Fallon County,M where
the issue was the enforceability of an exculpatory clause. An
exculpatory clause is a contractual provision where one party
agrees not to hold the other party liable for their acts of
negligence. The common law approach to exculpatory clauses
has always been to enforce them between parties who negotiated
them in areas of private concern, but not to enforce them in non-
negotiated areas of public concern.5 5 In fact, Montana employed
that common law analysis before Miller came along,5 6 but in
Miller the court discovered Section 28-2-702, a Field Code
provision which provides:
28-2-702. Contracts which violate policy of the law-
exemption from responsibility. All contracts which have for
their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from
responsibility for his own fraud, for willful injury to the person or
property of another, or for violation of law, whether willful or
negligent, are against the policy of the law.5 7
Section 28-2-702 tells us that you can't excuse another
person's fraud, willful injury, or violation of law. The court had
no trouble saying that if you agree the other person won't be
held liable for fraud, that shouldn't be enforced. And if you
agree that the other person shouldn't be held liable for willful
injury, that shouldn't be enforced. But then it asked, what is
violation of law, and it answered that law is everything,
53. Id. at 87 n.312.
54. 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383
P.2d 441 (1963).
56. See Haynes v. County of Missoula, 163 Mont. 270, 279, 517 P.2d 370, 376
(1973), (citing Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963)).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-702 (1999) (derived from FIELD Civ. C. § 828).
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including the duty not to be negligent.58 Therefore, the court
concluded, under Section 28-2-702, which says you can't agree to
exempt anyone from responsibility for violation of law, you can't
agree with someone not to hold them liable for their own
negligence.
The conclusion is that exculpatory clauses are never
enforceable, a result that was reached because of interpretation
of Section 28-2-702. I want to be clear here that I'm not
complaining about the result of the case, that exculpatory
clauses were held not enforceable. What I'm complaining about
is the reasoning, the jurisprudence. That is, whether
exculpatory clauses should be enforceable is a difficult question,
and in answering that question, common law jurisprudence
would force us to weigh competing policies, but Code
jurisprudence, as in this case, merely leads us to find the rule by
extracting language from the Code without any consideration of
why it's the rule or whether it should be the rule. In conclusion,
I think Montana's Code jurisprudence is not only not settled, but
a less desirable jurisprudence.
JUSTICE NELSON: I think my worthy opponent makes a
good case for keeping judges out of the interpretation of the law.
Actually, Chief Justice Wade made somewhat the same point in
his 1894 address. In his address, Chief Justice Wade stated:
[wihen we look into these volumes-into this great reservoir of the
common law, that law which we have been taught to revere as the
perfection of human reason-that law which not very long ago
authorized the settlement of legal controversies by wager of battle;
which, far into the present century denied to persons accused of
crime the benefit of counsel; and which authorized capital
punishment for larceny and one hundred and sixty other crimes-
we find decisions contradictory and irreconcilable; decisions
overruling, modifying, limiting or enlarging other decisions; right
decisions supported by wrong reasons, and wrong decisions
supported by good reasons, by technicalities or by no reason at all;
verbose and involved decisions, obscured by obiter dicta and
speculative theories; broad and learned decisions, and narrow and
ignorant ones; and decisions that decide the same thing over and
over again.
58. The court stated: "Law consists of constitutions, Wickham v. Grand River Dam
Authority (1941), 189 Okl. 540, 118 P.2d 640, 643; statutes and case law, Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins (1938), 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 1194; as well
as common law, Fenn v. Holme (1859), 62 U.S. 481, 486, 21 How. 481, 486, 16 L.Ed. 198,
200." Miller, 222 Mont. at 221, 721 P.2d at 346-47. Not surprisingly, in defining law,
the court did not look to the definitions of the term in the Montana Code Annotated. See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1-101 to -109.
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Common law judges and lawyers are very much influenced and
controlled by precedent. They spend their lives in searching for
decisions that will determine the question in hand, but as
precedents may generally be found on both sides of the question,
the law is rendered doubtful and uncertain as to the most learned,
and as to those who by intuition are presumed to know it in all its
length and breadth, with its thousand variations and exceptions,
it is a dark and insoluble mystery. 59
The Chief Justice was right. Unfortunately, to the extent
that we still rely on judges to interpret the codes and statutes; to
the extent that we still decide cases based on the common law;
and to the extent that we still argue legal principles on the basis
of decisional authority and precedent, many, if not all, of Chief
Justice Wade's observations are as true today as they were in
1894. Many cases are still decided in contradictory and
irreconcilable fashion, as my worthy opponent has noted. Many
precedents still conflict. Many opinions are result-oriented and
are decided for wrong reasons, on technicalities or on no
rationale at all. The law's devotion to the principle of stare
decisis tends to cause the perpetuation of these errors.
Where principles of the common law have, over the course of
generations and a multitude of court cases and opinions, become
settled beyond reasonable dispute, the reduction of these
principles to a Civil Code, clothed in plain and understandable
language, has settled, harmonized and fixed these undisputed
rules. As to a given code provision, each person who reads it
knows what the law is; his or her neighbor reads the same law
and knows the same thing. If formerly there were case decisions
on this common law point-one decision for, the other against-
the code harmonizes and fixes the rule for all to know.
Doubtless, our modern society could not function without
codes of laws. In point of fact, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-a national organization
that has been in existence from before the time that Montana
became a state-has been highly successful in writing
comprehensive codes on given subjects for adoption by state
legislatures with a view of settling, harmonizing and fixing the
law not only within an adopting state but, as well, from state-to-
state throughout the nation. These uniform laws and acts have
in many ways taken up and succeeded where David W. Field
failed. These uniform laws cover a multitude of areas of the
law-from commercial transactions to organ donations; from
59. See Wade, supra note 38, at 3.
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marriage and divorce to determining parentage; from
prescribing rules of evidence to probating wills and estates; from
regulating sports agents to governing transactions in the world
of business that is rapidly becoming a paperless one. Montana
has been a leader in enacting uniform laws as they have been
promulgated by the Uniform Law's Commission. Again,
Montana early on recognized the benefits of codification.
Montana early on recognized how subtle principles of the law
could be harmonized and fixed for all to know. And much to its
credit, Montana has continued this tradition into the present
time.
Has the Montana Civil Code reduced the volume of the law?
Should it?
JUSTICE NELSON: I look at this question as primarily a
practical one, and I will answer the second question first.
Should codification reduce the volume of the law? I submit that
the answer is obvious: yes, it should. In 1894, Chief Justice
Wade quoted Judge Dillon for the proposition that already, at
the turn of the century, the "law" was an "unwieldy mass of
reports," numbering in the tens of thousands and expected to
grow without ceasing.60
I submit that to the extent that every point of law did not
have to be decided anew via case-specific analysis, the sheer
volume of case reports must necessarily decrease. Codification
provided this benefit. The Civil Code, for example, in setting
forth in plain terms the various well-settled principles of the
common law, made it unnecessary to decide every case via a
court opinion. The codification effort made it possible to
determine, in advance, what law governed a particular situation
without resort to the courts.
One can only imagine what would be the sheer volume of
case books in today's modern law library if there were no codes;
if every legal dispute had to be resolved by resort to the courts
instead of to the code book; if the multitude of obsolete,
conflicting and repetitious cases that Judge Dillon decried even
at the turn of the century were increased exponentially at the
pace with which litigation has increased in this century. The
adoption of the Civil Code, in my view, has undoubtedly reduced
the volume of law because the code dictates the outcome of
60. See Wade, supra note 38, at 5.
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disputes in advance and lessens the necessity to rely on the
courts.
To question whether this is a laudable result, one only need
recognize that increasingly law libraries, law firms and
practitioners are literally running out of room and space in
which to store and maintain the case reporters that still exist
today. Moreover, the costs attendant to maintaining these
collections is beyond the reach of all but the most wealthy law
firms or governments. I would submit to you that this
volume/cost problem is, to some extent, being alleviated by
electronic databases, computer search engines and electronic
storage and access. Book libraries are not the necessity that
they once were, and I hope that our electronic capabilities
continue to alleviate the volume/cost problem.
So, has the Montana Civil Code reduced the volume of law?
In my view, it has. Should it? Absolutely.
PROF. BURNHAM: As I mentioned earlier, I have no
problem with codes that exist for the purpose of regulation, but
we're talking about codes that supposedly displace the common
law. What are most civil disputes about? In tort, they often
involve the expansion of liability. In contract, they often involve
interpretation. In property, they often involve the legal effect of
actions or writings. These questions aren't answered by the
Codes, and even if they were, it would rarely occur that a lawyer
is going to look at one of those code sections and say, "Well, that
decides that case, that's the end of it." We've all become experts
at manipulating statutes, and an argument can be made either
about the application of the rule to the facts or about the
interpretation of the Code language. Therefore the Code will not
reduce the volume of the law.
Should the Code reduce the volume of the law? You'll find
many important principles absent from the Code. For example,
in contracts, important principles such as reliance and
restitution are not mentioned in the Code. It would certainly
reduce the volume of law if we ignored those principles, but it
would also reduce the volume of justice. What would reduce the
volume of law? As I mentioned, I can't imagine a lawyer
concluding he or she was foreclosed from making an argument
because of a Code provision. On the other hand, I will admit
that a lawyer may not feel foreclosed by a common law decision
on point either, because he or she is likely to find a conflicting
common law decision. So what is likely to reduce the volume of
law? I have great respect for my worthy opponent, Justice
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Nelson, for the kind of opinions he has been writing for the
court, where he collects the precedents, identifies the better
rule, and distinguishes the cases that have followed the better
rule from those that have not.61 This kind of analysis, by seeing
the rule and the facts in a larger setting than the present
dispute, provides the kind of certainty and predictability that
may well reduce the volume of the law. But it is not a Code
analysis, it is a common law analysis.
Would Montana's law be capable of better adapting to local
conditions or changing conditions without the Civil Code's
constraints?
PROF. BURNHAM: Montanans seem to think that
everything bad in Montana comes from California, and now we
know the origin of that sentiment. It started with the Field
Code. And the Field Code, in fact, has the double whammy of
coming to California from New York, the other source of our
misery. Field himself thought that flexibility was no virtue, that
the law should be fixed. He said, "To say that a law is
expansive, elastic or accommodating, is as much as to say that it
is no law at all."62 He did not want the law to be flexible.
Professor Natelson, in his article on covenants running with the
land, found that the Montana Supreme Court got the law right
not because of the Code, but in spite of it. He states that "the
Montana codifiers failed to sense the difficulties inherent in
importing foreign law."63 I admit that examples demonstrating
the problems that arose from importing foreign law are thin.
For example, one example is that Montanans were quite upset
to find that in the criminal code, stealing a horse or a cow was
merely petty theft.64
I found another example in the area of contracts, where
there is a strong emphasis running through the Code on written
contracts. This troubles me because I always thought that in
the West your word was your bond, but under the Code you'd
better get it in writing. One example is Section 28-2-1602,
which states, "A contract in writing may be altered by a contract
61. See, e.g., Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc., 271 Mont. 209, 896
P.2d 411 (1995); State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997).
62. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, at xxi
(1865).
63. Natelson, supra note 52, at 91.
64. See Morriss, Plenty of Laws, supra note 14, at 411 n.277.
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in writing or by an executed oral agreement, and not
otherwise."65 In other words, you can't modify a written contract
with an oral modification. We had a case in Montana on point
where a consumer had borrowed money from a bank to buy a car
and gave the bank a security interest in the car.66 The writing
said that the consumer would pay on the first of the month. One
month the consumer called the bank and said, "I'm a little short
of cash this month. Is it okay if I pay on the 15th?" The bank
said, "Sure, no problem." On the 12th, the bank declared the
debt in default and repossessed the car. The consumer called
the bank and asked, "What about the agreement that I could
pay on the 15th?" The bank said, "Ha Ha, you didn't get it in
writing." That modification doesn't count under the Code.
Common law contracts doesn't care about writings, so I
always wondered why the Code was so insistent on getting
everything in writing. One day it came to me-that's the
philosophy of the Code with respect to the law. Since the
codifiers were always attacking unwritten law, that is the
common law, why shouldn't they carry the same view over into
private law, where parties make the law that governs
themselves in a contract? The reason they shouldn't is because
private law is a function of customs and culture, but the Code
leaves no room for customs and culture. One size has to fit all,
whether in New York or California or Montana.
Furthermore, the Code does not accommodate change. In
California, the legislature frequently updates, modernizes, and
corrects the Code. This happens rarely in Montana, so our law
is essentially frozen, not just in 1895, when it was adopted, but
in 1865, when it was written. Here's a couple of examples of
how our Code is frozen in time. One is in the area of mental
illness. Section 28-2-203 of the Code contains the common law
rule that mental illness is a defense to the formation of a
contract.67 Everybody knows that, but it's one of those rules
that is easy to state and hard to apply. The reason it's hard to
apply is that it's hard to come up with a definition of what it
means to be of unsound mind. Field had no problem with that.
He defined it in Field Code Section 13, which provided, "Persons
of unsound mind within the meaning of this codes are idiots,
lunatics, imbeciles and habitual drunkards." That is one of the
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1602 (1999) (derived from CAL. CIV. C. § 1698).
66. Baird v. Norwest Bank, 255 Mont. 317, 843 P.2d 327 (1992).
67. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-203 (1999) (derived from FIELD CIv. C. § 21).
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few Field Code statutes that's been repealed in Montana.68
There's now no definition in the Code of what it means to be of
unsound mind, and that's the way it should be. That's exactly
the kind of area where the common law is best suited to apply a
definition that reflects changing understanding of the nature of
mental illness.
Here's another example of where the Code has not
accommodated change. Section 30-11-210 is in a sales provision,
and it may surprise you. It says, "No implied warranty in
mere contract of sale. Except as prescribed by this part, a
mere contract of sale or agreement to sell does not imply a
warrantee."69 We all know that's not the rule of the Uniform
Commercial Code,70 which has displaced this part of the Code,
but it has only displaced it with respect to the sale of goods, the
area of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 71 So if you
have a sale outside the sale of goods, a merchant seller would
not be giving an implied warranty of merchantability. That
seems to me not the correct result under modern thinking,
which would probably analogize to the Uniform Commercial
Code, and say that if in the area of the sale of goods merchant
sellers impliedly give a warranty of merchantability, so they
should in areas outside the sale of goods.7 2
Another area where the Code got it wrong and the courts
have gotten it right is Section 28-2-409, which provides:
28-2-409. What constitutes mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is
a mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of
the person making the mistake and consisting in:
(1) an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact, past or
present, material to the contract; or
(2) belief in the present existence of a thing material to the
contract which does not exist or in the past existence of such a
thing which has not existed.
This section has to do with the mistake defense to formation
68. 1979 Mont. Laws Ch. 119 § 35.
69. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-210 (1999) (derived from FIELD CIv. C. § 878).
70. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-314(1) (1999).
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-11-224 (1999) ("Uniform Commercial Code
overrides. This part shall not apply to sales subject to the Uniform Commercial
Code.").
72. The Montana Supreme Court used exactly that reasoning in applying the
Uniform Commercial Code principle of unconscionability to a lease of goods, which at the
time was not a UCC transaction. See All-States Leasing Company v. Top Hat Lounge,
Inc., 198 Mont. 1, 649 P.2d 1250 (1982). Unconscionability is now applied to leases of
goods by virtue of MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2A-108(1) (1999).
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of a contract. When it tells us that "Mistake of fact is a mistake
not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the
person making the mistake," it is describing unilateral mistake.
But everybody knows that the common law rule is that to avoid
a contract you have to have mutual mistake. The Montana
Supreme Court consistently gets it right. And how does the
Montana Supreme Court get it right? By ignoring the Code.
What does that teach us about respect for law when the only
route to a correct conclusion is to ignore the Code? In
conclusion, the Code does not assist us in our understanding of
law because it is not flexible and it does not adapt to modern
circumstances.
JUSTICE NELSON: I'll begin with a quote from Chief
Justice Wade:
The common law has grown up out of particular instances and
cases. Hence, its growth has lacked symmetry and regularity.
Unsettled questions and principles, made so by contradictory or
doubtful decisions, have had to wait the uncertain and accidental
coming of a case whose decision would settle and put to rest the
doubt and uncertainty. Case-made law does not anticipate. It is
for the case at hand. It does not provide for the future, except by
leaving precedents, sometimes contradictory and antagonistic, for
its guide. And so the growth of the law has been irregular, and to
a certain extent accidental, depending upon the uncertainty of the
coming of the right kind of case to add anything to its substance.
Codification, while it will not impede, will harmonize and make
symmetrical this development of the law.73
Again, I submit that Chief Justice Wade was correct. Case-
made law does not anticipate; it decides the case at hand and is
reactive to the fact situation at issue. Case-made law relies on
precedent and the growth of the law is, therefore, slow,
irregular, and typically behind the times. While one may argue
that the Civil Code "constrains" the growth and development of
the law, it is more true that the Civil Code can be easily changed
and modified from legislative session to legislative session in
order to accommodate changing social and economic conditions.
I am immediately reminded of Montana's 1995 legislative
session when it came to the attention of the Legislature that
there was, apparently, a problem of men being "turgid" in
public. The Legislature jumped into the fray immediately and
proposed legislation to prohibit "public turgidity." Fortunately,
the law did not pass, but this serves as an example of just how
quickly the Legislature can respond to "pressing" social issues.
73. See Wade, supra note 38, at 5.
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Seriously though, how effective would case law have been in
addressing national environmental problems that did not even
exist during the development of the common law. How long, if
at all, will it take the courts to effectively deal, on a case-by-case
basis, with issues such as the privacy of genetic information,
with issues of assisted reproduction, with contract issues
involving gestation and surrogacy. The answer is obvious: the
common law is unsuited to deal with these complex issues. In
fact, the only way to effectively control, regulate and govern
modern legal relationships and modern legal problems spawned
by today's technologies and globalization is via the adoption of
well-written, comprehensive codes. I would submit to you that
Field's Civil Code is the precursor to these modern legal codes.
Concluding remarks
PROF. BURNHAM: In conclusion, I would say we get by
with the Code largely by ignoring it when it suits our purposes.
For example, in that case involving the bank that agreed to
accept a late payment,7 4 did the court follow the Code provision?
Of course not. So you have a lose-lose situation under the Code.
If you follow it, you get a wrong result. If you don't follow it,
you're not showing respect for the rule of law. Field was a true
believer and he was incredulous that anyone could question his
god, the Code. In fact, he wouldn't have approved of this debate
because he said, "The question whether a Code is desirable is
simply a question between written and unwritten law. That this
was even debatable is one of the most remarkable facts in the
history of jurisprudence."7 5 He didn't think he even needed to
debate that issue, it was so obvious.
By the way, I learned from Professor Morriss that I do have
one thing in common with Field. He mentioned that on his
grave, Field wanted inscribed something about his Codes. I've
often said that because I want my students to remember the
rule, I want inscribed on my grave, "The U.C.C. applies to all
sale of goods, not just to merchants." That inscription may help
you remember that.7 6 But to some extent, Field has carried the
day. As Justice Nelson has alluded to, the Uniform Laws may
74. Baird, 255 Mont. 317, 843 P.2d 327.
75. Field & Bradford, supra note 28, at vii.
76. See generally Scott J. Burnham, Why Do Law Students Insist That Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code Applies Only to Merchants and What Can We Do About It?
63 BROOK. L. REV. 1271 (1997).
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be part of his legacy, and while I approve of many Uniform
Laws, they unfortunately create a demand for law to be created
in the form of Codes. For example, I hear people saying "Oh, we
have to have a law for the Internet, we have to have a law for
electronic commerce, what are we going to do?" Well, you are a
voice crying in the wilderness if you say as I say, "We have a law
for the Internet. We have a law for electronic commerce. It's
called the common law." Where do we find it? Again, we find it
in accessible well-written sources, those syntheses of the
common law such as Farnsworth on Contracts and the
Restatement, and if we got rid of the Code as a source in
Montana, we'd have fine jurisprudence by using these
documents as sources.
There is harm in the Code in that it makes rules look like
regulations. I mentioned that without the Code, the common
law rules of contract might be seen again as default rules, rules
that can be changed by the parties. Without the Code, we would
have decisions based on the application of principles and
policies, rather than that mechanical jurisprudence that comes
from blindly following a statute that may never have been
appropriate for Montana's needs.
JUSTICE NELSON: The central question that we were
asked to debate and address today was whether or not the
Montana Field Code, encompassing statutes in common law
areas such as contracts and property, should be repealed. I
think that, if anything, this debate has demonstrated that the
Montana Field Codes should not repealed. Certainly, the codes
are not perfect, and certainly courts' interpretations of those
codes are not perfect. I suggest to you that the codes have
centralized, have elucidated, have fixed, and have harmonized a
few central premises of the common law and a few well-
recognized, well-articulated principles of the common law.
Further, Montana's case law has very effectively built on these
central common law premises and principles. If you want to see
a real mess, repeal the Montana Field Codes and turn the courts
loose. Montana courts and judges have already been accused of
being "terrorists in black robes." Unless you are a proponent of
terrorism, you should want to retain the Montana Field Codes.
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